↑ “Archived copy”. Bản gốc lưu trữ ngày 25 tháng 5 năm 2020. Truy cập ngày 24 tháng 12 năm 2018.Quản lý CS1: bản lưu trữ là tiêu đề (liên kết)
↑ Matt Waldman (tháng 6 năm 2010). “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents” (PDF). Crisis States Working Papers. Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (series no.2, no. 18): 3. Bản gốc (PDF) lưu trữ ngày 26 tháng 12 năm 2010. Truy cập ngày 16 tháng 10 năm 2011. In the 1980s the ISI was instrumental in supporting seven Sunni Muslim mujahideen groups in their jihad against the Soviets and was the principal conduit of covert US and Saudi funding. It subsequently played a pivotal role in the emergence of the Taliban (Coll 2005:292) and Pakistan provided significant political, financial, military and logistical support to the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996–2001)(Rashid 2001).
↑ Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to ngày 10 tháng 9 năm 2001. Penguin Group. tr. 289–297. ISBN9781594200076. Yet ISI's ambition was greater than its purse. Pakistan's army suffered from acute money problems during 1995. The army commanded the lion's share of Pakistan's budget, but with American aid cut over the nuclear issue, there was not much to go around. ... As it had during the 1980s, ISI needed Saudi intelligence, and it needed wealthy Islamist patrons from the Persian Gulf. ... The Pakistanis were advertising the Taliban to the Saudis as an important new force on the Afghan scene. ... The scale of Saudi payments and subsidies to Pakistan's army and intelligence service during the mid-1990s has never been disclosed. Judging by the practices of the previous decade, direct transfers and oil price subsidies to Pakistan's military probably amounted in some years to at least several hundred million dollars. This bilateral support helped ISI build up its proxy jihad forces in both Kashmir and Afghanistan.
